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Persistent and widespread evidence of fiscal indiscipline raises questions about the 
likely distortions causing such behaviour. To improve policymakers’ incentives, 
institutional arrangements ranging from legally binding fiscal rules to public 
commitments supported by strong accountability mechanisms and procedural 
arrangements have received considerable attention. The underlying idea is that well-
designed institutions can effectively discourage deviations from desirable policies 
because they somehow “tie the hands” of elected policymakers. Yet the significance 
of the role of institutions in improving policy outcomes has been the subject of 
debate. The issue revolves around the extent to which institutions themselves can 
truly alter the motivations of policymakers.  
In the first part of the paper, an illustrative model of fiscal policy discusses the 
theoretical underpinnings of fiscal institutions. The deficit bias comes from electoral 
uncertainty because it reduces the time horizon of partisan policymakers. In principle, 
institutions—such as a constitutional amendment banning excessive deficits—can 
alleviate such bias. In practice, however, the credibility of such institutions remains an 
open question. I therefore analyse the credibility of fiscal rules and show that 
democratic accountability is one natural mechanism through which deviations from 
the rule can be made costly enough to deter cheating. However, the power of voters is 
limited by the lack of budgetary transparency and by the possibility that the deficit 
bias be rooted elsewhere than in myopic partisanship.  
The second part of the paper explores some of the empirical implications of the 
theory, looking specifically at fiscal behaviour in a panel of 14 EU countries. I first 
confirm that government instability (which entails greater uncertainty for incumbents) 
is a statistically significant and quantitatively meaningful source of deficit bias. I then 
quantify econometrically the relationship between institutions and fiscal outcomes, 
and investigate whether the relationship between institutions and outcomes is causal. 
(This is an important question because intrinsically well-behaved governments may 
adopt strict rules and institutions merely to signal a strong commitment to discipline).  
Although the findings are preliminary, there is evidence that reverse causality may 
entail a serious bias in the estimated effect of institutions on outcomes. Specifically, 
fiscal rules and institutions do not seem to affect budgetary outcomes once one 
controls for the influence of political factors that are generally deemed conducive to a 
commitment to fiscal discipline. 
 
The key policy conclusion emerging from the study is that rules are not primarily 
conceived as an agency of restraint, but as a public statement of the government’s 
underlying commitment to fiscal discipline. (In short, they are not meant to be 
binding.) To the extent that fiscal rules appropriately reflect a broad social consensus 
on desirable policies, they can effectively help secure electoral rewards for good fiscal 
behaviour, and thereby enhance the credibility of policymakers’ commitment. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Persistent and widespread evidence of fiscal indiscipline led many analysts to investigate the 
likely distortions causing such behavior, and to suggest effective ways to improve 
policymakers’ incentives. In that context, institutional arrangements—ranging from legally 
binding fiscal rules to public commitments supported by strong accountability mechanisms 
and procedural arrangements—have received considerable attention. The underlying idea is 
that well-designed institutions can effectively discourage deviations from desirable policies 
because they somehow “tie the hands” of elected policymakers. Yet the significance of the 
role of institutions in improving policy outcomes has been the subject of debate on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds (see Schick, 2004, for an informal discussion). The issue 
revolves around the extent to which institutions themselves can truly alter the motivations of 
policymakers. This paper provides a formal assessment of the role of fiscal institutions in 
improving fiscal discipline, and explores some empirical implications of that analysis. 
The paper comprises two parts. In the first, a stylized model of fiscal policy illustrates the 
theoretical underpinnings of fiscal institutions. As in Tabellini and Alesina (1990), electoral 
uncertainty amounts to shorten the time horizon of partisan policymakers, creating a deficit 
bias. In principle, institutions—such as a constitutional amendment banning excessive 
deficits—can alleviate such bias. In practice, however, the credibility of such institutions 
remains an open question, as evidenced by recent experience.
3 In line with the works of 
McCallum (1995) and Jensen (1997) in the realm of monetary policy, I therefore analyze the 
credibility of fiscal rules and show that it depends on the existence of sufficiently high costs 
of bypassing or changing the rule. I argue that democratic accountability is one natural 
mechanism through which deviations from the rule can be made costly. However, the 
analysis suggests that the power of voters is limited by the lack of budgetary transparency 
and by the possibility that the deficit bias be rooted elsewhere than in myopic partisanship. 
Although third-party enforcement and market sanctions could also play a role and be 
investigated in the context of the model, the former is generally limited to subnational fiscal 
rules whereas market mechanisms are often deemed weak and highly nonlinear in advanced 
economies (Bayoumi, Goldstein, and Woglom, 1995).  
Beyond the credibility issue, the contribution of institutions over and above the influence of 
other factors, particularly that of specific political constituencies, has been questioned in the 
literature. It has been argued for instance that institutions only reflect preferences of 
dominant constituencies for a certain course of action, and what matters therefore are not the 
institutions per se, but rather the power of these constituencies (Posen 1995). I examine the 
extent to which this argument overlooks a key role institutions can play to reduce the 
consequences of asymmetric information between voters and policymakers.  
                                                 
3 The most striking illustration is of course the failure to enforce the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in 
November 2003. The subsequent revision of the Pact amounted to reduce the probability that the rule bind while 
failing to address the real weakness of the existing arrangement, namely its enforcement procedure (Beetsma 
and Debrun, 2007).    3  
 
The second part of the paper explores some of the empirical implications of the theory, 
looking specifically at fiscal behavior in a panel EU-15 countries. I quantify econometrically 
the relationship between institutions and fiscal outcomes, and explicitly test for the null 
hypothesis that the relationship between institutions and outcomes is causal. Indeed, the 
theoretical analysis suggests that intrinsically well-behaved governments may adopt strict 
rules and institutions merely to signal competence, pointing to reverse causality (from good 
outcomes to good institutions) in standard least-squares regressions.  
Although the findings are clearly preliminary, there is evidence that reverse causality may 
entail a serious bias in the estimated effect of institutions on outcomes. Specifically, fiscal 
rules and institutions do not seem to affect budgetary outcomes once one controls for the 
influence of political factors that are generally deemed conducive to a commitment to fiscal 
discipline.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II positions this paper in the relevant 
literature. Section III develops a simple theoretical model and discusses the implications for 
the theoretical analysis. In Section IV, I describe the preliminary empirical findings for a 
panel of 14 EU countries, while policy implications and conclusions are proposed in Section 
V. 
 
II.   THE ELUSIVE LINK BETWEEN RULES AND POLICY OUTCOMES  
 
A.   Déjà Vu: The Debate on Central Bank Independence  
The literature has identified many potential sources of deficit bias, and in dealing with it, the 
debate has so far largely focused on the design of fiscal rules, in particular, their coverage, 
nature, degree of state contingency, and the specific targets (see e.g. Calmfors, 2005, and 
Morris, Ongena and Schuknecht, 2006). As noted by Wyplosz (2005), there is a striking 
parallel between the current debate and the vast literature of the 1980s and the 1990s on the 
merits of monetary institutions, including rules-based monetary policy frameworks and 
central bank independence. In both cases, the very same question dominates discussions: how 
can Society effectively encourage policymakers to avoid systematic deviations from an 
optimal policy stance? Wyplosz (2005) observes that after the demise of monetary rules, 
institutional reforms (in that case, granting political independence to the central bank in day-
to-day policy decisions) became the dominant idea in the monetary policy literature, and he 
argues that independent institutions could play a role in the fiscal realm as well (see Debrun, 
Hauner, and Kumar, 2005 for a survey and a taxonomy of the many proposals in the same 
vein).  
 
One strand of the monetary policy literature adopted a more skeptical (if not squarely 
orthogonal) view on the role of institutions in shaping policy outcomes, and the arguments 
developed there might apply with even greater strength to the current fiscal policy debate. A    4  
 
key element in the skeptics’ thinking is that establishing rules (or institutions) does not 
change the underlying motivations or preferences of the policymakers. As such they 
potentially suffer from the same problems as policies themselves, and in particular, optimal 
institutions may lack credibility (McCallum, 1995).
4  
 
Proponents of institutions invariably reply that institutions are essentially defined by the high 
costs of changing them so that they are intrinsically more credible than discretionary policies. 
In these matters, however, faith cannot be the answer, and there is a clear need to be explicit 
about the mechanisms through which bypassing or changing institutions could entail costs for 
policymakers. After all, even constitutional provisions need not be strictly binding. For 
instance, McCallum (1995) notes that the U.S. Constitution still lacks an amendment taking 
the dollar out of the metallic standard, whereas a superficial reading of the Belgian 
Constitution would suggest that the King of the Belgians is the most powerful man in the 
land. 
 
In the model below, I explicitly address McCallum’s point, allowing policymakers to decide 
on both policies and the enforcement of fiscal institutions. The costs of changing institutions 
are explicitly introduced, and the model identifies the level beyond which they effectively 
deter systematic deviations from optimal policies. To the extent that the fiscal rule is 
considered as a reasonable proxy for the optimal policy, a combination of complete 
budgetary transparency and strong democratic accountability suffice to establish credibility. 
Even assuming non-transparent budgets, accountable governments may still find it useful to 
use institutions as a signal of competence rewarded with extra votes. In both cases, the 
impact of institutions on the deficit does not come from the “stick” of sanctions imposed by 
some third-party enforcer (or the capital markets), but from the “carrot” of higher re-election 
chances, which in turn reduces the temptation for excessive deficits. In that sense, the rule 
“works” not because it is binding, but because it embodies broad policy preferences. 
Another related critique of the role of institutions is due to Posen (1995) who argues that in a 
democracy, institutions can only be sustained if they reflect deeper social preferences or 
permanent features of the political system. That argument again implies that institutions per 
se do not change underlying incentives. In the context of central bank independence, Posen 
(1995) concludes that “both central bank independence and a coalition in society committed 
to protecting that independence are necessary to achieve the low inflation heretofore 
ascribed to central bank independence; either alone is insufficient (p. 271).” While 
institutions may well be merely decorative under complete information (i.e. the public knows 
the true motivation and competence of the government), their signaling role under 
                                                 
4 In McCallum’s words, institutions per se do not “overcome the motivation” for biased policies but “merely 
relocate it.”    5  
 
incomplete information may again explain why governments set up formal fiscal 
frameworks, even though they may not directly affect incentives.
5  
B.   Key Features of the Model 
In Section III, I propose an illustrative politico-economic model of fiscal policy aimed at 
putting the above arguments in a tractable and consistent framework. Inevitably, simplicity 
comes at the price of several ad hoc assumptions which nevertheless remain in the range of 
plausibility.  
A deficit bias arises in this model because uncertainty about re-election increases the 
discount rate of partisan policymakers, who, by definition, care about future fiscal policy 
only if they expect to be in charge. Unlike the original Tabellini-Alesina (1990) model, 
electoral uncertainty is endogenous and rooted in asymmetric information about 
policymakers’ motivations and competence. Specifically, rational voters only re-elect the 
incumbent administration if the latter demonstrates sufficient ability to deliver a quantity of 
public goods deemed commensurate to tax revenues. In fact, policymakers themselves are 
uncertain as to whether their actions will be successful in delivering enough public goods, 
and there is no systematic difference in the level of competence between the two political 
parties. The less tolerant the voters vis-à-vis policy failures, the greater electoral uncertainty, 
and the larger the deficit bias. 
In that context, a simple balanced-budget rule can be enacted, and its enforcement (i.e. the 
process through which a violation of the rule entails utility losses) should be strict enough to 
discourage the policymaker to deviate from the optimal policy. The problem is that a credible 
enforcement of the rule can only result from the decision of a non-partisan body because in 
the absence of costs for ignoring the rule, a partisan decisionmaker will always have an 
incentive to revert to the discretionary outcome. One natural way to rationalize such costs is 
to assume that voters hold policymakers accountable for sticking to the rule (because it 
encapsulates the optimal policy). Hence, if voters can perfectly observe budgetary outcomes 
(transparency), compliance is rewarded by certain re-election, and in this model, the 
elimination of electoral uncertainty removes any incentive to deviate from the rule. That said, 
the combination of transparency and accountability is not a magic bullet in the case where 
the fiscal bias comes from elsewhere, including primarily from fiscal illusion (i.e. voters 
themselves would have a preference for short-term deficits) or from common pool problems 
(see Krostrup and Wyplosz, 2006, for a discussion of possible solutions).  
The lack of budgetary transparency is another obvious obstacle to the effectiveness of fiscal 
rules and institutions. The reason is that voters cannot disentangle the deficit from policy 
failures, and can only observe their sum. In that conjecture, high deficits may be used 
opportunistically by policymakers to mask policy failures whereas good policy surprises may 
                                                 
5 Stéclebout-Orseau and Hallerberg (2007) develop an full-fledged model of the signaling role of independent 
watchdogs.    6  
 
come handy to hide an excessive deficit. Although the electoral gains of sticking to the rules 
are a priori unclear, they will clearly be stronger if voters do not pay much attention to policy 
failures and are correspondingly more concerned by evidence of excessive deficits. This 
implies that under opacity, fiscal rules are more likely to be effective precisely when 
electoral uncertainty and the discretionary deficit bias are low to start with.  
To summarize, and in contrast to existing studies,
6 the model illustrates the importance of the 
electorate, both as a determinant of the bias itself (through the tolerance for policy failures), 
and as the key player in rule’s enforcement. The institutional set-up is simple and comprises 
two components: a numerical deficit rule that can be interpreted as a benchmark 
characterizing the optimal policy, and an enforcement mechanism that imposes a cost on 
deviations from the benchmark. In line with McCallum’s critique, the credibility of fiscal 
institutions rests on sufficiently high electoral rewards to stick to them.
7  
These theoretical issues raise a number of concerns regarding empirical tests of the 
effectiveness of institutions. In particular, simultaneity bias is likely to be important because 
governments with only moderate deficit bias are more likely than others to benefit from 
discipline-enhancing institutions.  
 
III. AN ILLUSTRATIVE MODEL OF FISCAL INSTITUTIONS 
This section elaborates on the key issues noted above in the debate on the effectiveness of 
fiscal institutions. To illustrate the main points in a consistent theoretical framework, I use a 
simple politico-economic model of fiscal policy in the spirit of Tabellini and Alesina (1990). 
The model draws on Beetsma and Debrun (2007) but differs in two important dimensions. 
Firstly, I introduce voters’ behavior to allow for an explicit analysis of institutions’ 
credibility. Secondly, I ignore possible bias in the composition of expenditure, and only look 
at the overall deficit. 
A.   The Model 
Consider a small endowment economy with a large number of atomistic individuals deriving 
utility from the consumption of both private and public goods. Individuals are identical and 
the world ends after two periods. The typical individual’s preferences are represented by a 
utility function U  that is separable over time and types of good: 
                                                 
6 Examples include Tabellini and Alesina (1990), Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997), Peletier, Dur, and 
Swank (1999), Debrun (2000), Dixit and Lambertini (2003), Manasse (2005), Beetsma and Debrun (2007), and 
Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2006). 
7 In the context of monetary policy delegation, Jensen (1997) overcomes the McCallum critique by introducing 
exogenous costs to reappoint a new central banker.    7  
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where  t c  represents consumption of the private good in period t, while  t q  denotes the 
provision of a public good. The functions  ) (⋅ u  and  ) (⋅ v  are concave, strictly increasing and 
twice continuously differentiable, that is  0 > ′ u ,  0 > ′ v ,  0 < ′ ′ u , and  0 < ′ ′ v . Moreover, I also 
assume that  0 ) 0 ( = v .  0 E  is the expectation operator based on information available at the 
beginning of period 1. To simplify notation, and without loss of generality, assume that the 
real interest rate and the social discount rate are both equal to zero. 
All agents in the economy can borrow freely on domestic and international capital markets so 
that the consumer’s intertemporal budget constraint can be written as: 
( ) l y c + − = 1 1 1 τ ,                                                           (2a) 
( ) l y c − − = 2 2 1 τ ,                                                         (2b) 
whereτ  is a constant and exogenous income tax rate (essentially parametrizing the size of 
the government sector), l is the stock of net private liabilities at the end of period 1, and  t y  
is the endowment at time t. In addition, assume that  0 ≥ t c , 2 , 1 = t , which implies 
() () . 1 1 2 1 y l y τ τ − ≤ ≤ − −  Period 1 income is subject to a zero-mean multiplicative random 
shock  [] ε ε ε ; − ∈ with  1 < ε , while period 2 income is assumed to be deterministic:
8 
() ε + = 1 1 y y , and  y y = 2 . 
There are two political parties indexed by  L C Q , = . Both parties share individuals’ 
preferences only to the extent that they are in power to deliver the public good. The latter is 
identical irrespective of the party. Fiscal policy is also subject to a mechanism discouraging 
policymakers to accumulate public debt b  beyond a certain threshold b . The utility cost of 
breaching the threshold is denoted by  ) (b S , with  ( ) 0 = b S  if  b b ≤ , and  () ( ) b b k b S − =  with 
0 ≥ k  if  b b > . One can think of  b b−  as a numerical fiscal rule and of k , as the 
enforcement mechanism through which violations of the rule turn into utility losses for 
policymakers. The objective function of the policymaker (expressed in per-capita terms) 
therefore writes as follows: 
() ()() ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
− + = ∑
=
b S q v c u E V
t
t Q t Q
2
1
, 0 , . ,L C Q =                                (3) 
                                                 
8 Randomizing period 2 income only complicates the notation without bringing additional insight to the 
analysis.    8  
 
with 0 , = t C q  if  L Q = , 0 , = t L q  if  C Q = . In the absence of borrowing restrictions, fiscal 
policy decisions are subject to the intertemporal budget constraint: 
1 1 1 , δ τ − + = b y qQ ,                                                           (4a) 
2 2 2 , δ τ − − = b y qQ ,                                                          (4b) 
where  t δ  is a random failure in public good delivery attributable to unforeseeable policy 
mistakes, administrative capacity problems, or the action of corrupt bureaucrats siphoning off 
government resources (as in Debrun, Masson, and Pattillo, 2005). To simplify the formal 
analysis, consider that  t δ  is uniformly distributed over the interval [ ] δ ; 0 . As in the case of 
consumers’ decisions, I impose non-negativity constraints on public good provision:  0 ≥ t q , 
2 , 1 = t , implying  δ τ δ τ − ≤ ≤ + − 2 1 y b y . Notice that the distribution of policy failures is 
the same for both parties so that there is no actual difference in “type” (e.g. a more competent 
versus a less competent) between the two political parties.  
The only source of inefficiency in the model is the absence of public information on 
policymakers’ ability to efficiently deliver public goods.
9 As a result, voters can only infer 
such ability on the basis of actual actions. Specifically, they assign a non-zero probability to 
the fact that a policy failure beyond a certain threshold 
+ δ  signals an underlying lack of 
competence—in other words, some failures are deemed too big to be purely random. Voters 
also ignore the true ex-ante probability distribution of δ , and whether there exists any 
difference in type among policymakers of different parties. However, they do observe b —
which I equate with perfect budgetary transparency—which in turn allows them to assess ex-
post the magnitude of policy failures, and possibly, adjust their voting decision. Formally, 
they assign a fixed probability  [ [ 2 1 , 0 ∈ ψ  that a policy failure 
+ >δ δt  can occur under a 
competent government. At the end of period 1, individuals either re-elect the incumbent 
(party C  by assumption) or vote it out—in either case by a unanimous vote. Voters will re-
elect party C  if:
  
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 2 , 1 2 , 1 L C q v E q v E ≥ ,                                                       (5) 
where  1 E  designates the expectations operator at the end of period 1.  
Expression (5) indicates that if the incumbent is not believed to be less competent than the 
challenger in delivering public goods, it will be re-elected. While voters’ beliefs about 
competence are the same for both parties at the beginning of period 1, they are updated 
                                                 
9 The assumption of an under-informed public is fairly common in theoretical analyses of fiscal bias. See 
Morris, Ongena, and Schuknecht (2006) for a survey.    9  
 
following the realization of  1 δ . The incumbent’s ex-ante assessment of re-election chances 
thus reflects the probability of occurrence of a large policy failure 
+ ≥δ δt  (see 
Proposition 1). Notice that individuals assess policymakers’ competence on the sole basis of 
their ability to deliver public goods in the most efficient way given the budget constraint. The 
level of the deficit at the end of period 1 therefore plays no role in the voting decision since 
both political parties will have to repay the debt anyway. 
Proposition 1:  
If  2 1 0 < ≤ψ  and voters follow (5), then, at the beginning of period 1, the incumbent 
assigns a probability  ( ) δ δ
+ − =1 r  of not being re-elected. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Importantly, the probability r  of losing the election depends on how flexibly voters assess 
policy failures. Flexibility (that is when 
+ δ  is large but below δ ) reduces that probability, 
effectively loosening the link between information asymmetry and electoral uncertainty.  
Events unfold as follows. In period 0, a representative constitutional convention (or a 
referendum) imposes a debt (or deficit) cap b  which carries a utility cost  ) (b S  when  b b > . 
At the beginning of period 1, Nature draws the governing party (C by assumption). Then, the 
shock ε  is realized and government chooses b  and  1 , C q  so as to maximize  C V . After that,  1 δ  
materializes, and private consumers select l and  1 c  maximizing their expected utility U . 
Finally, elections take place. In period 2, all debts are paid off and the world ends. The 
equilibrium is found by backward induction to ensure time-consistency. 
The last three stages of the solution are immediate. Indeed, period 2 decisions result from the 
budget constraints, and voters’ behavior depends on the realization of  1 δ . Also, private 
consumption-saving decisions are independent of fiscal policy. Hence, denoting optimal 
values by a star superscript, one has  ( )( ) [ ] y y c c + − = = 1
*
2
*
1 1 2 1 τ  and  () ε τ y l − − = 1 2 1
* . Of 
course, fiscal policy would affect private behavior if productive expenditure was introduced 
in the model (as in Peletier, Dur, and Swank, 1999; or Beetsma and Debrun, 2007) or if the 
real interest rate depended on b , which is not the case by virtue of the small economy 
assumption. 
B.   Optimal Fiscal Policy 
Before turning to the political equilibrium, I characterize the first-best fiscal policy, assuming 
that a social planner is in charge. Electoral constraints and fiscal institutions are therefore 
irrelevant, and the planner selects a public debt level 
* b  defined as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [] 2 / 2 / 1 2 max arg
*
1
* δ τ δ ε τ − − + − + + + = b y v b y v c u b
b
     (6)    10  
 
The first order condition for (6) is:
10 
() ( ) ( ) 2 / 2 / 1
* * δ τ δ ε τ − − ′ = − + + ′ b y v b y v                                         (7) 
The socially optimal public debt 
* b  equates the marginal utility of additional deficit-financed 
public good provision in period 1 with the marginal disutility of foregone public good 
provision in period 2 (because additional resources are allocated to debt repayment). The 
optimal policy thus achieves 
*
2
*
1 q q = , and it follows that  2
* ε τy b − = . On average, the 
optimal public debt is zero, and deficits or surpluses are only used to smooth out the income 
shock.  
C.   Political Equilibrium and the Role of Fiscal Institutions 
In the political equilibrium, the policymaker is exposed to electoral uncertainty and to the 
possible costs of breaching the fiscal constitution  ) (b S . Denoting by 
* * b  the deficit 
maximizing policymaker’s expected utility, I  can write: 
() () ( ) () ( ) () [] b S b y v r b y v c u b
b
− − − − + − + + + = 2 / 1 2 / 1 2 max arg
*
1
* * δ τ δ ε τ    (8) 
Equation (8) shows that uncertainty about re-election brings the policymaker’s discount 
factor ( r − 1 ) below the social discount factor. The first order condition for (8) is: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * * * 2 / 1 2 / 1 b b y v r b y v Γ + − − ′ − = − + + ′ δ τ δ ε τ                       (9) 
with  () 0 = Γ b  if  b b ≤ , and  () 0 > = Γ k b  if  b b > . 
Equation (9) implicitly defines 
* * b  (and the corresponding 
* *
1 q  and 
* *
2 q ) as a function of all 
other parameters and variables in the model. The main features of the political equilibrium 
are formalized in Proposition 2.  
Proposition 2: 
 
1.      Deficit (debt) bias: In general, the equilibrium public debt 
* * b  differs from its 
optimal level 
* b . Specifically, if 
* b b >  for all  [ ] ε ε ε ; − ∈ , the equilibrium public 
debt is suboptimally high for all  1 0 ≤ < r . 
2.      Fiscal institutions: If  b b >
* * , a higher marginal disutility of breaching the 
fiscal rule (k ) reduces equilibrium public debt. Specifically, a fiscal constitution 
                                                 
10 The second-order condition is satisfied by concavity of  ) (⋅ v .    11  
 
characterized by  ( ) 0
*
1 ,
* > ′ = C q v r k  and 
* b b =  ensures that 
* b  is implemented in the 
political equilibrium (i.e. 
* * * b b = ). 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
A geometrical illustration of Proposition 2 is useful. Figure 1 displays the graph of marginal 
utility functions  ) (⋅ ′ v  in terms of b  for  0 = ε . The downward sloping curve represents the 
marginal utility derived from current public good provision  ( ) 1 , C q v′ , whereas upward sloping 
curves show the expected marginal utility of future public good provision under different 
conjectures: a social planner (plain line), electoral uncertainty (bold dotted line), and 
electoral uncertainty under an optimal fiscal rule (light dotted line). Each intersection 
between two curves with opposite slopes describes a solution to the optimization problem, 
and its projection on the horizontal axis gives the corresponding deficit.  
Point A identifies the planner solution defined by (7). There, the two marginal utility curves 
are symmetric with respect to the vertical axis so that equilibrium debt is  0
* = b . Electoral 
uncertainty leads policymakers to discount the expected marginal utility of future public 
good provision more heavily than a social planner. The upward-sloping curve is 
consequently flatter (bold, dotted line), leading to a political equilibrium B, defined by (9) 
and characterized by a deficit 
* * * b b > . A degree of enforcement  0 > k  associated with the 
fiscal rule 
* b b =  pushes up the upward-sloping curve, reducing equilibrium deficit. In 
particular, an enforcement level  ( ) ( ) 1 , 2 ,
*
C C q v r q v r k ′ = ′ =  eliminates the “wedge” between the 
political and the socially optimal discount factors (light dotted line).    12  
 
Figure 1: The Geometry of Interior Solutions (for  0 = ε ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The optimal institutional setup can be interpreted as a state-contingent deficit rule whose 
violation entails a utility loss (or sanction) that depends upon the nature of sanction and the 
strictness of enforcement (k ). While the model offers no insight on the former, it suggests 
that the latter should increase with the incentive to deviate from 
* b . It is easy to verify that 
such incentive increases with the extent of political uncertainty ( ) / ( 1 δ δ
+ − = r ) and the 
related capacity constraints altering public good delivery ( 2 / δ ), and decreases with the size 
of the government sector (τ ), and the level of per-capita income ( y ). The impact of r  on 
the fiscal wedge operates directly through the policymaker’s subjective discount factor (the 
higher  r , the greater the relative importance of period-1 expenditure). The effect of the 
magnitude of policy failures, government size, and per-capita income all reflect induced 
changes in the marginal utility of public goods. Specifically, elements contributing to a low 
delivery of public goods increases their marginal utility, and thereby, the government’s 
incentive to spend. 
Quite intuitively, these results suggest that a fiscal bias is expected to be large in poor 
countries with small governments facing significant capacity constraints and political 
instability. These countries correspondingly need fiscal institutions providing stricter 
enforcement mechanisms to support their commitment to the optimal fiscal policy. By 
contrast, affluent countries with large government sectors, good delivery capacities, and 
b 
) (⋅ ′ v  
( ) 1 , C q v′  
( ) 2 , C q v′  
* b  
* * b  
( )
*
2 , ) 1 ( k q v r C + ′ −  
( ) 2 , ) 1 ( C q v r ′ −  
A
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enjoying political stability should experience less severe deviations from the optimal policy, 
relaxing somewhat the need for strict enforcement mechanisms.
11  
D.   Are Optimal Institutions Credible? 
Time-Consistency 
While Proposition 2 establishes the joint existence of a fiscal bias and of an institutional 
response to it, the effectiveness of the latter is assumed. A classic argument in the literature is 
that of a given constitutional clause that policymakers diligently observe (Tabellini and 
Alesina, 1990). In this theoretical setup, it is easy to check that the fiscal arrangement ( )
* *,b k  
results from the maximization problem of a representative agent (a benevolent “founding 
father,” a nonpartisan constitutional convention, or the outcome of a referendum) that fully 
internalizes the features of the political equilibrium in periods 1 and 2. 
In practice, however, constitutions and lower-level norms can be amended or scrapped; and if 
they prove too hard to change, they may simply not be enforced. Allowing policymakers to 
amend ( )
* *,b k  or to bypass it adds one step to the solution procedure, providing a test for the 
time-consistency of fiscal institutions (see also Krogstrup and Wyplosz, 2006). 
The eventual re-optimization of k  (which I can interpret as either a change in the rule itself 
or in its enforcement) takes place just before fiscal policy is selected. It is easy to show that if 
changing ( )
* *,b k  entails no cost for the policymaker, the fiscal arrangement will be scrapped 
or fall into abeyance, yielding  0
* * = k . Specifically, I can write: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) []
* * * * * * *
1
* * 2 / 1 2 / 1 2 max arg b S b y v r b y v c u k
k
− − − − + − + + + = δ τ δ ε τ  (10) 
At  b b >
* * , the first order condition for 
* * k follows: 
 
() () () () [] () 0 2 / 1 2 / 1
* *
* *
* * * * * * = − −
∂
∂
− − − ′ − − − + + ′ b b
k
b
k b y v r b y v δ τ δ ε τ ,           (11) 
which simplifies to  ( ) 0
* * = − − b b  because (9) implies that the terms inside the square 
brackets sum to zero. It follows that (11) is satisfied as long as  b b =
* * . However, the second 
order condition indicates that this strategy actually minimizes  C V  because 
0
* *
2
0
2
>
∂
∂
− =
∂
∂
k
b
k
V E C . Given the first and second derivative functions of  C V E0  with respect 
                                                 
11 One way to interpret this is that governments facing severe resource constraints may need strict conditionality 
attached to an IMF-supported program to avoid a deficit bias, while richer governments may rely on possibly 
less demanding domestic arrangements.    14  
 
to k , and taking into account the fact that  0 = k  for all  b b < , one can immediately conclude 
that the value of k  maximizing  C V  is a corner solution  0
* * = k  (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Re-optimization of k  by Politicians (for 
* b b = ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Democratic Accountability and “Ownership” of the Rule 
Figure 2 suggests that optimal institutions can only be credible if changing (or ignoring) them 
brings about specific utility losses—which should be strictly greater than the vertical 
distance D. These losses can be rationalized in various ways. One possibility is to argue that 
the raison d’être of a fiscal rule is to guide underinformed voters in assessing fiscal 
performance. In that conjecture, the rule could reduce or even eliminate the effect of 
asymmetric information on voters’ behavior and thereby, on equilibrium fiscal policy. In the 
presence of a rule, the government’s capacity to adhere to it would thus become a reliable 
* k  
* * * b b =  
k  
* * * b b <  
0
* * = k  
C V E0  
D    15  
 
indication of competence in the eyes of the voters.
 12 Given equation (5) and by analogy with 
Proposition 1, compliance with the fiscal rule would then ensure reelection.
 13  
 
In the model, the guarantee of re-election in case of compliance readily neutralizes the effect 
of information asymmetry, and is therefore a sufficient reward to encourage politicians to 
stick to the fiscal rule. Formally, one can check that a compliant government derives more 
utility than a cheater:  () ( ) [ ]
1
* *
1 , 0
2
1
*
, 0 =
=
> ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡∑ r C
t
t C q v E q v E . Because a cheater would be voted out 
with certainty (i.e.  1 = r ) and  0 > ′ v , he would select the corner solution  δ τ − =
= 2 1
* * y b
r . 
Substituting 
*
,t C q  and 
1
* *
1 , = r C q  with the budget constraints and using the (explicit) solutions for 
* b  and 
1
* *
= r b , the concavity of  ) (⋅ v  guarantees that the inequality holds: 
() () () ( ) () δ ε τ δ ε τ 2 / 3 2 2 / 2 1 2 − + > − + y v y v .  
 
This result illustrates that, absent fiscal illusion, democratic accountability can play a key 
role in ensuring the credibility of optimal fiscal institutions. What is more, if electoral 
uncertainty is the only source of deficit bias, democratic accountability is sufficient to 
establish such credibility.
14 However, if the bias is rooted in other distortions, accountability 
may not be enough to deter unpleasant outcomes. For instance, policymakers may be 
intrinsically more impatient than the representative consumer (e.g., they may have a 
subjective discount rate  0 > ρ ), in which case the inequality discussed above may not hold: 
() () ( ) ( ) () δ ε τ δ ε τ ρ 2 / 3 2 ? 2 / 2 1 ) 2 ( − + − + − y v y v . The effectiveness of the rules thus also 
depends upon the specific nature of the fiscal bias. 
 
Another critical assumption underlying the above result is that voters perfectly observe all 
the components of the budget identities (4-a/b); in short, the budget is transparent.
15 
Mounting evidence of creative accounting and outright manipulation of budget numbers 
                                                 
12 This of course requires that voters do not suffer from a myopic appetite for fiscal deficits—or “fiscal 
illusion.” Calmfors (2005) and Morris, Ongena, and Schuknecht (2006) discuss fiscal illusion in detail. 
13 In a model of monetary policy delegation, Jensen (1997) argues that reneging on central bank independence 
causes reputation losses, which can help sustain near-optimal institutions in a repeated game. In the present 
three-period setup, however, repeated games become quite cumbersome and it is more convenient to think in 
terms of political costs associated with either a change in institutions or an attempt to bypass them. Another 
well-known shortcoming of repeated games is the multiplicity of reputational equilibria, reflecting the arbitrary 
definition of the “trigger strategies.” 
14 Observe also that in this instance, rewarding compliance with the fiscal rule is a socially optimal voting 
strategy for voters. 
15 See Castellani (2002) for a formal analysis of accountability and transparency along similar lines in a model 
of monetary policy delegation.    16  
 
undermines the assumption that formal adherence to the rule is perceived as a sufficient 
indication of competence. To study budgetary opacity in this model, I assume that fiscal 
outturns are revealed to individuals after the elections. 
 
The Implications of Budgetary Opacity 
Opacity implies that voters can only observe  1 , C q  (what they get from government), 1 y τ (what 
they pay to government), and the aggregate  1 δ − = Λ b . Although the deficit and the policy 
failure cannot be observed separately, a low Λ may indicate a large policy failure while a 
high Λ may reflect a deviation from the rule, two events that individuals would interpret as a 
sign of incompetence. Hence, opacity prevents the detection of combinations of large policy 
failure and a high deficit.
16  
 
By analogy with Proposition 1, I assume that voters revise upward their belief that the 
incumbent is incompetent—and elect the challenger—if Λ lies outside some interval around 
* b . Define that interval as []
− + − − δ δ
* * ;b b , with  0 ≤
− δ , indicating that voters intend to 
punish deviations from 
* b  that they could not plausibly explain by random shocks on public 
good delivery.
17  
 
Budgetary opacity modifies policymakers’ perception of re-election chances. Specifically, 
the probability  0 r  of being voted out is now:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
− + + − < + − + > ≡ δ δ δ δ
*
1
*
1 0 Pr Pr b b b b r       (12) 
 
Equation (12) highlights the link between fiscal policy choices, voters’ behavior, and the 
extent of political uncertainty. The first term indicates that higher deficits help offset the 
impact of policy failures on Λ, lowering the probability that voters perceive such failures. 
This points to circumstances under which opacity provides policymakers with an opportunity 
to increase re-election chances by boosting current borrowing. Opacity may thus lead to an 
opportunistic deficit bias.
18 The second term captures the effect of opacity on democratic 
accountability: random policy failures hamper the detection of breaches of the fiscal rule, 
especially if voters’ tolerance for 
* b > Λ  is large (i.e. 
− δ  is large in absolute value).  
                                                 
16 Recall that competence is only an issue for the under-informed voters. In reality, neither high deficits nor 
large policy failures originate in a lack of competence. 
17 A negative value for the delivery shock is possible from the voters’ perspective because they do not know the 
true distribution. Of course, 
− δ  could be strictly positive if individuals had a profound distrust of 
policymakers’ capacity to efficiently deliver public goods. For the sake of brevity, I do not explicitly analyze 
this issue here. 
18 See Rogoff (1990) although here the argument is related specifically to a lack of transparency, rather than 
information asymmetry per se.     17  
 
 
Because the actual distribution of δ  is bounded between 0 and δ , there are limits to the 
effect of fiscal policy on electoral outcomes. In particular, higher deficits reduce the risk of 
detection of policy failures only if 
+ − ≤ − δ δ
* b b . Beyond that, the first term in (12) 
remains equal to zero as b  increases because the deficit is already large enough to prevent 
the detection of policy failures through low realizations of Λ. Likewise, any change in b  
leaves the second term in (12) equal to zero as long as 
− − < δ
* b b  because the deviation of 
b  from 
* b  would be too small to be attributed to cheating. The implication for the formal 
analysis is that the marginal utility of future public good provision exhibits discontinuities at 
− −δ
* b  and 
+ − + δ δ
* b . In the remainder of this section, I focus on selected solutions with 
interesting policy implications.  
 
Case # 1: Voters have a low tolerance for signs of excessive deficits (i.e.
− δ  is small in 
absolute value) 
If voters revise their assessment of incumbent’s incompetence for only small positive 
deviations of Λ from 
* b , then the policymaker’s marginal utility function (for  0 = k ) writes 
as follows: 
 
() ( ) ()( )
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  if   , 1
  if   , ) 1 (
  if   ,
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If the deficit is such that 
− − ≤ δ
* b b , then it is too small for voters to detect cheating on the 
rule. In that interval, the probability of re-election only depends on their capacity to detect 
policy failures. As higher deficits lessens that capacity, opportunistic policymakers have an 
additional motive to deviate from 
* b  (raising b  lowers  0 r ). Clearly, if 
− δ  is small enough 
and  ( ) δ 2 , C q v , large enough, the first order condition for maximum utility is unlikely to be 
satisfied in that interval (see however Case #2 below) 
 
When  []
+ − − + − ∈ δ δ δ
* * ;b b b , the link between ex-ante fiscal policy and electoral 
outcomes breaks down because the electoral benefits from higher deficits (i.e. making the 
detection of policy failures less likely) are completely offset by a higher probability of being 
found cheating on the fiscal rule. An interior solution for equilibrium fiscal policy located in 
that interval would thus satisfy a first-order condition identical to (9) with  0 = k .  
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Finally, if 
+ − + > δ δ
* b b , policymakers know that the deficit is too high for voters to detect 
any policy failure, and  ( ) ( ) [ ] δ δ δ δ
− − + − = + − < =
* *
1 0 Pr b b b b r . Opportunistic 
policymakers are now encouraged to show restraint because increasing the deficit entails a 
higher risk of being voted out for violating the rule. If the latter effect is sufficiently strong, a 
corner solution where 
+ − + = δ δ
* * * b b  may be observed (see Figure 3). The resulting deficit 
would be lower than in the case of an interior solution (despite being associated with the 
same degree of political uncertainty).  
 
Figure 3: Example of Equilibrium Deficit Under Budgetary Opacity (for  0 1 = ε ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A number of interesting equilibria are therefore possible: 
 
•  If voters are prone to sanction the incumbent with only limited evidence of policy 
failure (i.e. 
+ δ  is low), equation (9) is satisfied for  0 = k  and  []
+ − − + − ∈ δ δ δ
* * * * ;b b b . 
This is the interior solution depicted by point B in Figure 3. Hence, if information asymmetry 
seriously distorts voters’ behavior (leading to a large deficit bias under full discretion), 
budgetary opacity renders democratic accountability (and fiscal institutions) completely 
ineffective: the equilibrium deficit remains 
* *
B b .  
b 
) (⋅ ′ v   ( ) 1 , C q v′   ( ) 2 , C q v′  
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•  By contrast, if voters show substantial flexibility in the face of signs of policy failure 
(i.e., 
+ δ  is large), the equilibrium deficit is more likely to be lower than in B. Indeed, voters 
are unable to detect policy failures even at fairly low deficit levels so that the only impact of 
higher deficits on re-election chances operate through a greater risk of being caught cheating 
on the rule. In Figure 3, the corresponding equilibrium could be a corner solution C or an 
interior solution if the last segment of the upward-sloping curve crosses the downward 
sloping bold curve to the left of B.  
Overall, governments faced with less electoral uncertainty arising from information 
asymmetry—and correspondingly lower deficit bias—are also more likely to extract benefits 
discipline-enhancing fiscal institutions, making them more likely to adopt such mechanisms.  
 
Case #2: Voters treat evidence of excessive deficit “flexibly” (i.e. 
− δ  is large in absolute 
value) 
The policymaker’s marginal utility function (for  0 = k ) now writes: 
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Because the second term in (12) drops off for all deficits 
− − < δ
* b b , the incumbent can 
increase re-election chances by raising the public debt (opportunistic deficit bias). If 
− δ  is 
large enough in absolute value, then voters never conclude that the fiscal rule has been 
violated, and an interior solution exists.  
In that case, the impact of opacity on the resulting equilibrium deficit is ambiguous. On the 
one hand, higher deficits reduce voters’ ability to detect large policy mistakes, and 
correspondingly increase the likelihood of re-election. On the other hand, the greater 
probability of re-election associated with higher deficits reduces the bias stemming from 
electoral uncertainty. The tension between these two effects determines whether the 
equilibrium deficit is larger or smaller than under transparency and full discretion (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4: Interior Solutions Under Budgetary Opacity (for  0 1 = ε  and 
− − < δ
* b b ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 shows that if the “opportunistic wedge”  ( ) δ 2 , C q v  is sufficiently small with respect 
to  ( ) 2 , C q v′ , the impact of higher deficits on electoral uncertainty can be strong enough to 
deliver a lower debt level (
* *
C b ) than in the absence of the rule but full budget transparency 
(
* *
B b ). By contrast, strongly opportunistic policymakers ( ( ) δ 2 , C q v  is large) could be lured 
into a high deficit equilibrium 
* * * *
B D b b > . Hence, to the extent that it creates an opportunistic 
deficit bias, a rule operating under budgetary opacity could be counterproductive. 
 
For the same reason as in Case #1, a corner solution 
+ − + δ δ
* b  may emerge if voters 
consider that only large policy failures warrant an adjustment of their beliefs regarding 
policymaker’s competence (Figure 5). Indeed, for all  [ ]
− + − − + ∈ δ δ δ
* * ;b b b , the deficit is 
too high for voters to perceive any policy failure, and too low to raise concerns about 
possible violations of the rule, resulting in the absence of electoral uncertainty (i.e.  0 0 = r ). 
b 
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Figure 5: Corner Solution Under Budgetary Opacity (for  0 1 = ε ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E.   Summary and Implications for the Empirical Analysis 
The model points to a number of important determinants of fiscal outcomes and institutions 
that are interesting in their own right, and which an empirical analysis should consider. It 
also suggests that OLS estimates of the quantitative relationship between institutions and 
fiscal performance may be biased. 
 
First, the model assumes that electoral uncertainty is a key source of deficit bias. The reason 
is that the perceived risk of not being re-elected drives policymakers’ discount rate below the 
social discount rate. That risk originates in voters’ incomplete information about the true 
motivations of elected officials. The model thus suggests that, other things equal, countries 
with higher political instability (and a correspondingly higher risk of officials being voted 
out) should experience higher deficits on average. In what follows, I examine whether this is 
indeed the case in a sample of industrial and EU countries because the validity of some key 
conclusions of the above analysis, including those related to the effectiveness of institutions, 
is sensitive to that assumption 
 
The second insight of the model is that enforcement is key. Hence, to be useful, quantitative 
indicators of fiscal restraints need to properly capture the enforcement dimension. We have 
seen that the key parameter in the fiscal framework is not the numerical deficit rule—which 
b 
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simply provides voters with a benchmark characterizing the optimal policy—but the strength 
of the enforcement mechanism, whose role is to turn deviations from the rule into actual 
utility losses for policymakers. There are of course a number of ways, including through an 
outside enforcer, that this can occur. 
 
The third insight is the possibility of reverse causality that may bias quantitative estimates of 
the impact of institutions on outcomes. A first reason for reverse causality is that institutions 
may be time-inconsistent because fiscal arrangements are self-enforced. This means that 
intrinsically less stable governments are likely to be more prone to weaken the disciplinary 
aspect of fiscal institutions (or not to adopt them in the first place), and that such weakening 
is more likely to occur in bad times than in good times (when even noncredible institutions 
are unlikely to be binding). A second reason for reverse causality relates to the fact that 
budgetary opacity may create an incentive for policymakers to opportunistically increase the 
deficit in order to secure electoral gains. Indeed, an analysis of the possible equilibria under 
opacity showed that if voters are sufficiently strict when holding the government accountable 
for suspected deviations from the rule, institutions are more likely to reduce equilibrium 
deficits if the deficit bias is low to start with. This implies that countries with relatively minor 
fiscal problems may be more likely to effectively implement discipline-enhancing fiscal rules 
than countries with serious fiscal issues. 
 
The final insight is that the effectiveness of fiscal institutions is likely to be country-specific. 
This suggests that panel analyses—which are now common in quantitative approaches of 
fiscal behavior
19—should pay particular attention to cross-sectional heterogeneity. 
Specifically, the model illustrates the important role of transparency and democratic 
accountability (and by extension, of the broader political context). Indeed, to the extent that a 
fiscal rule crystallizes social consensus on what constitutes “optimal” policy, it will be used 
by voters to assess fiscal performance, possibly leading them to hold the incumbent 
accountable for complying with the rule. Democratic accountability can be a sufficient 
enforcement mechanism and make the rule credible. Of course, accountability works best if 
budgets are transparent—in the sense that its components are perfectly observable by voters.  
 
 
III.   EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This section undertakes empirical analysis drawing on the above insights provided by the 
model. I focus on 14 European Union Member States (the EU-15 excluding Luxembourg) 
over the period  1990–2004, using the European Commission’s (2006) database on fiscal 
institutions. The latter, based on a recent survey among member states, comprises 
quantitative, time-varying indices of fiscal rule restrictiveness and coverage, as well as 
                                                 
19 See Mélitz (1997), Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2002), Galì and Perotti (2003), Debrun and Faruqee 
(2004), or Annett (2006), among others.    23  
 
qualitative data on nonpartisan fiscal agencies.
20 I first provide a brief description of some 
stylized facts on the link between fiscal institutions and budgetary performance, and on the 
main characteristics of institutional arrangements. I then undertake more systematic 
econometric analysis regarding fiscal behavior with a view to test the robustness of the 
apparent relationship between institutions and outcomes.  
 
A.   Fiscal Institutions and Budgetary Performance: Some Stylized Facts 
As the European Commission (2006) notes, the restrictiveness and coverage of national fiscal 
rules have increased in EU countries over the past two decades. This immediately raises two 
questions. The first is whether these developments have been associated with an 
improvement in fiscal performance. The second question relates to the role of underlying 
policy preferences—what should ultimately matter according to the model above.  
 
Institutional Reforms and Fiscal Performance 
Under the null hypothesis that fiscal institutions effectively influence policymakers’ 
behavior, institutional changes—a tightening of the rules or an expansion of their coverage—
should lead to improvements in fiscal performance. Figure 6a to 6c below displays the time 
path of a median fiscal indicator before and after a meaningful “tightening” in institutional 
indicators (i.e., increased restrictiveness and or expanded coverage).
21  
 
The first of these charts shows that in the three-year prior to the institutional change, there 
was a steady but quite pronounced improvement in the primary balance.
22 In other words, 
institutional reforms do appear to lag improvements in fiscal performance. In fact, in the 
three years following the change (T to T+3), there was no further improvement (and even 
some deterioration) in the balance
23. This suggests that at the time of the reform at least, 
institutional changes sought to consolidate a prior change in policy preferences or priorities 
rather than to effectively constrain policymakers’ to adopt policies they would not have opted 
for in the absence of reform.  
                                                 
20 A full description of the data can be found in European Commission (2006). 
21 The “change” or the “event” is predetermined as an increase in the index of fiscal restrictiveness of at least 10 
percent. Larger cut offs reduced the sample size somewhat but did not lead to an appreciable change in the 
conclusions.    
22 Similar results were obtained for the cyclically-adjusted primary balance. 
23 Using mean rather than median provides similar results.    24  
 
 
 
Figure 6a. Fiscal Rules Restrictiveness and Primary Balances 
 
Figure 6b. Fiscal Coverage and Primary Balances 
Figure 6c. Fiscal Rules Restrictiveness and Debt 
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The above interpretation is corroborated when examining the change in the coverage of fiscal 
rules. In the three years prior to the increase in the coverage, there appeared to have been 
quite a noticeable increase in the average primary balance of the sample countries. However, 
after the broadening of the rules, the primary balance stabilized with little change in the three 
subsequent years.  
 
Using the public debt as a fiscal indicator (Figure 6c), we see that a noticeable decline in the 
debt to GDP ratio had begun in the three year period to the reform, and that the decline 
continued albeit at a slightly weaker pace in the subsequent period. The stabilization in the 
primary balance after that period may thus reflect a lesser need to run high primary surpluses, 
probably reflecting a decline interest rates in many countries over the period covered by this 
analysis. Yet the conclusion remains: reforms do not appear to affect the underlying policy 
trends that prevailed before their implementation. 
 
Institutions and “Revealed Preferences” 
To check whether consistent stylized facts also emerge over a longer period of time, consider 
the correlation between countries’ “revealed preference” for fiscal prudence—measured by 
the change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio over the  1980s—and the level of the 
Commission’s institutional indices in  2004. In line with the above, one would expect 
countries that tended to have relatively disciplined fiscal policy end up having opted for more 
restrictive rules in the last 15 years. Of course, it could be that the countries with restrictive 
rules in 2004, already had some form of rules-based fiscal policy. The same exercise using 
the change in the rule restrictiveness index over 1990–2004, instead of the level in 2004 is 
therefore proposed as well.
 24 
                                                 
24 Given that there has been relatively much less change in the role played by fiscal agencies, the above analysis 
was confined to the restrictiveness and coverage of fiscal rules.     
 
Figure 7. Institutions and Revealed Preferences 
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The results given in Figure 7 again suggest that countries that had large increases in public 
debt during the 1980s also ended up being the countries that had the least restrictive fiscal 
rules in 2004. Similarly, the countries that had the largest increase in debt were the ones that 
had the narrower coverage of fiscal rules. The same holds true—albeit with a somewhat 
lower correlation—if one takes the change in the rules restrictiveness index. Of course, the 
unconditional correlations are not spectacularly high, the dispersion around regression lines 
is substantial, and the fact that outliers may be shaping the overall picture cannot be 
dismissed. However, one cannot reject a priori the possibility that a revealed preference for 
fiscal conservatism could drive countries’ attitudes vis-à-vis fiscal rules. 
 
Fiscal Councils: Main features and Interaction with Rules 
In addition to rules, many countries set up, some of them a long-time ago, nonpartisan 
agencies expected to provide an independent input to the budget process, with a view to limit 
the scope for politicization of fiscal decisions (see Debrun, Hauner and Kumar, 2005 for a 
discussion of the issues and country experiences). The Commission’s survey covered many 
relevant dimensions of these institutions, including the legal guarantees on their 
independence, their potential impact on the policymaking process (including through the 
provision of independent forecasts), and their perceived influence on the public debate. 
Summary indices for these dimensions were calculated. 
 
Unlike the above two exercises that focused on the relationship between rules and 
performance, here I examine more closely the channels through which the fiscal councils 
might be able to have an impact, and also the relationship between the fiscal council and 
fiscal rules. One premise is that the greater the degree of restraint exercised by the fiscal 
council, or the greater the guarantee of independence from political interference, the greater 
the likelihood of perceived or actual impact. There may also be a presumption of some 
complementarity between fiscal rules and fiscal councils, with the latter contributing to a 
more effective enforcement of the former.  
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Figure 8. Fiscal Councils 
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Figure 8. Fiscal Councils (continued) 
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The results are shown in Figure 8. We see a strong positive relationship between the extent of 
legal restraint exerted by the fiscal council and its perceived impact on fiscal performance. 
This is complemented by a positive relationship between formal guarantees of political 
independence and the perceived impact of the fiscal council. It is also interesting to note that 
there appears to have been some positive relationship between the index of legal restraint and 
the guarantee of independence, suggesting that countries instituting such agencies seemed 
serious in their willingness to establish the council’s effectiveness.  
 
By contrast, there does not appear to be any meaningful relationship between the legal 
restrictiveness of fiscal councils and the restrictiveness of fiscal rules. This indicates that 
countries with nominally more restrictive fiscal rules are not inclined to set up institutions 
that may potentially contribute to their enforcement. 
 
Unconditional correlations need of course to be complemented with a systematic assessment 
of fiscal rules and institutions in the context of a more comprehensive, multivariate model of 
fiscal behavior. In line with the theoretical analysis, the role of political variables is 
emphasized. I also explore the issue of reverse causality. 
 
B.   Econometric Analysis 
Fiscal behavior can be assessed by estimating “reaction functions” similar to Bohn (1998). 
Because of the relatively short time-series available for most fiscal variables, panel data 
techniques have increasingly been used despite the likely heterogeneity among individual 
countries’ behavior. In line with the literature, the general specification is given by: 
 
t i i t i t i t i t i x ns Institutio d p , , , 1 , 0 , ε η β γ ρ α + + ′ + + + = − ,   T t ,..., 1 = ,  , ,..., 1 N i =            (1) 
where  , it p  is the ratio of the primary balance to GDP in country i and time t,  ,1 it d −  is the 
public debt to GDP ratio at the end of period  1 − t ,  t i ns Institutio ,  is a time- and country-
specific measure of fiscal institutions,  t i x ,  is a vector of control variables,  i η are unobserved 
country effects, and  t i, ε  is a time- and country-specific disturbance. To better capture fiscal 
behavior, it is common to filter out the impact of automatic stabilizers on the primary 
balance, using the cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB) as the dependent variable.  
 
I proceed in three steps. First, I estimate standard reaction functions for a broader panel of 18 
industrial countries, ignoring fiscal institutions. The idea is to identify features of the political 
system that may cause a deficit bias in industrial countries.
25 In a second step, I build on the 
European Commission’s (2006) work to evaluate the potential for reverse causality and the 
possible role of non-partisan fiscal agencies.  
 
                                                 
25 The EU-15 minus Luxembourg, plus Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the U.S.    31  
 
Fiscal Behavior Omitting Fiscal Institutions 
The results reported in Table  1 confirm earlier findings in similar studies. First, fiscal 
behavior tends to exhibit a fairly high persistence, with an AR(1) term estimated to be around 
0.7. Second, the negative sign on the output gap variable suggests that on average, the 
countries in the panel have a tendency to react in a destabilizing fashion to output 
fluctuations (procyclicality). Thirdly, the response of the CAPB to the public debt is 
significant, robust, and positive, which is consistent with long-term solvency (Bohn, 1998). 
Those results are generally robust to the use of alternative estimators, including pooled OLS, 
LSDV (country fixed-effects), IV (instrumenting the output gap only), and GMM (Arelano 
and Bond’s dynamic panel estimator, which accounts for the possible small sample bias 
associated with fixed-effects estimation of an AR(1) panel data model). 
 
One interesting finding is that the introduction of political variables—a measure of 
government fragmentation, an ideology variable that increases with the degree of 
conservatism, and an index of government stability—eliminates most of the unexplained 
cross-sectional heterogeneity captured by country fixed effects (see the F-test of the null 
hypothesis that country effects are jointly redundant, and that fixed-effect and GMM 
estimators are correspondingly suffering from a specification bias). In particular, the 
significant and positive impact of government stability on fiscal outcomes is interesting.
26 To 
the extent that government stability is likely to be inversely correlated with electoral 
uncertainty (i.e., the government stability variable is a plausible proxy of the risk faced by an 
incumbent to be voted out), the result is consistent with the key assumption of the theoretical 
model (that electoral uncertainty is an important source of deficit bias). The estimates suggest 
that a reduction in government stability by one standard-deviation would reduce the CAPB 
by about 0.25 percent of GDP on average. Similarly, the sample range of the index (between 
3 and 11) corresponds to a difference of about 1 percent of GDP between the CAPB of a 
country with a very unstable government, and that of a very stable one. 
 
                                                 
26 The government stability variable is an index ranging from 0 to 12, with the highest figure indicating perfect 
stability. The index is taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), compiled by the PRS Group, a 
consultancy. Other political variables have been constructed using the World Bank’s Database on Political 
Institutions.     32  
 
Estimator:
Lagged dependent variable 0.73 *** 0.73 *** 0.72 *** 0.68 *** 0.76 *** 0.68 *** 0.67 *** 0.72 *** 0.63 ***
Output gap -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.10 *** -0.04 -0.06 -0.10 ** -0.07 **
Lagged public debt 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 *** 0.04 ***
Government fragmentation … … … -0.10 0.34 -0.10 -0.63 -0.19 -0.83
………
Ideology (conservative) … … … -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00
………
Government stability … … … 0.12 *** 0.10 ** 0.11 * 0.14 ** 0.11 ** 0.14 ***
………
Delegation (dummy) … … … … … … -0.01 -0.15 ***
…………… …
Commitment (dummy) … … … … … … 0.50 0.51 0.06
…………… …
Constant -1.60 *** -1.61 *** … -2.49 *** -1.51 *** 0.01 -2.56 *** -1.99 *** 0.02
…
R-squared (overall) …
F-test (country effects) 2.75 *** 2.77 *** 1.10 …
Sargan test (p-value) 1.00
Arellano-Bond test (p-value) 0.70
Fixed effects (country) …
Number of observations
Number of cross-sections 15
Table 1. Fiscal Behavior in a Panel of Industrial Countries
(Dependent variable: cyclically-adjusted primary balance)
(Robust t- or z-statistics in parentheses)
(-1.14)
(0.93)
-0.37
…
…
Yes
(-0.79)
(1.35)
(-3.41)
0.71
(13.12)
(3.64)
(0.78)
(2.22)
…
…
OLS
0.75
IV-DV
0.75
(-0.45)
(8.21) (8.19)
…
(28.79) (28.53) (47.65)
(-0.99)
…
Yes Yes
…
…
(0.75)
0.98
(1.22)
0.73
(4.70) (5.93)
…
0.76
18
…
0.11
GMM
(25.30)
(-0.70)
(4.09)
(-0.09)
(1.61)
(-0.54)
18
(-1.10)
(2.31)
(-3.87)
Yes
…
279
(15.86)
(4.28)
(-0.47)
GMM IV IV-DV
(16.14)
(-1.04)
(4.35)
(-0.17)
(-2.25)
(0.62)
(2.06)
18
(-1.15)
(2.18)
(-3.21)
…
…
No
(-0.03)
(1.44)
(-3.33) (0.46)
(1.13)
0.77
234
0.98
0.66
…
261
No
…
…
234
15
…
…
…
234
15
(-1.44)
(-0.11)
(2.31)
(-2.51)
GMM
(14.83)
(-1.72)
(5.44)
279
IV-DV
0.75
490
IV
(20.57)
(-7.52) (-7.54) (0.46)
(-2.64)
18
490
18
490
18  
 
With regard to the other explanatory variables, we see that government fragmentation and 
ideology do not appear to have any direct effect on the fiscal balance. Finally, it is worth 
noting that country specific dummies characterizing the type of fiscal governance in place to 
alleviate common pool problems (the so-called delegation and commitment models) have no 
robust impact on the average balance, which is in line with the findings of Annett (2006) for 
the post-1992 period, but also indicative of a potential collinearity problem between the two.  
 
The Role of Fiscal Institutions 
The availability of time-varying indices of restrictiveness and coverage of fiscal rules allows 
for a direct statistical test of their impact on fiscal behavior. In that regard, the Commission’s 
indices of fiscal rules are particularly useful as they encompass aspects of enforcement, 
which is important according to the theoretical model. In addition to focusing on political 
control variables, one novel aspect of the analysis is to examine the role of fiscal councils. As 
noted earlier, there is little to guide the construction of meaningful quantitative indices 
summarizing features of nonpartisan agencies likely to affect fiscal policy choices. 
Nonetheless, using the analytical framework proposed in Debrun, Hauner and Kumar (2005), 
I compiled indices of different features of fiscal councils (FCs) that might be regarded as 
likely to be related to fiscal performance. Extensive robustness checks clearly remain to be 
performed on those indices, and the results should therefore be taken with care.     
 
As noted earlier, there are good theoretical reasons and some prima facie evidence that the 
relationship between budgetary balances and fiscal rules may not be causal. First, it can be 
argued—and the theoretical analysis suggests—that governments adopt rules and institutions 
that merely reflect their underlying preferences. Hence, intrinsically profligate governments 
would be reluctant to adopt or maintain constraining fiscal arrangements, while fiscally 
conservative governments would be more prone to do so. Second, beyond the obvious 
possibility of reverse causality, omitted determinants of fiscal behavior could be correlated 
with institutions, also causing a bias in OLS estimates. 
 
Whereas instrumenting the fiscal rule indices emerges as a natural technical response to this 
potential issue, there is a scarcity of quality instruments (which have to be orthogonal to the 
error term but highly correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable) for institutional 
variables. One way to alleviate this problem is to rely on standard specification tests to 
exclude exogenous political variables that appear to play no direct role in fiscal behavior, and 
use them as instruments. In the present model, good candidates are government 
fragmentation and ideology. I also introduce other excluded instruments to capture 
exogenous factors that may have affected the decision to introduce national fiscal rules. The 
European Commission’s analysis points to the role played by the run-up to EMU, which may 
have encouraged countries to adopt stricter national rules to accompany the fiscal adjustment 
process, and by the introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact. Dummy variables 
capturing these events are therefore used as excluded instruments as well.
27 Estimates 
reported in Table 2 below also consider a dummy variable identifying election years in the 
EU countries. 
 
Another problem is that other explanatory variables may suffer from an endogeneity problem 
and could also be candidates for instrumentation. In particular, the fiscal council index, the 
output gap, the lagged primary balance, and the lagged public debt may all be correlated with 
the error term of the primary surplus equation, making them debatable instruments.
28 
However, instrumenting more than one variable raises a number of difficulties, including 
potential problems in the overall quality of the set of instruments. (For instance, a good 
instrument for the output gap may prove to be very weak for fiscal institutions). This is why 
Table 2 reports results where only one variable at a time is instrumented, namely the output 
gap and fiscal rule indices. In the absence of obvious instruments for the lagged public debt 
and the lagged CAPB, I rely on standard specification tests to check whether they are 
orthogonal to the error term. (The same tests are used to check for the exogeneity of the fiscal 
council index.) Of course, the power of these tests is still a matter of debate, and for all 
practical purposes, one should treat these results with caution. 
                                                 
27 These dummies proved highly insignificant when included in the model.  
28 One reason for such correlation is the possibility of time-invariant factors affecting the capacity or 
willingness to generate high primary surpluses in each country. Another reason is the possible persistence in the 
idiosyncratic shocks to primary surplus behavior. See Celasun, Debrun, and Ostry (2006) for a detailed 
discussion of the potential statistical biases related to the estimation of fiscal reaction functions, and Celasun 
and Kang (2006) for an assessment of alternative estimators.    34  
 
 
Lagged CAPB 0.63 *** 0.63 *** 0.63 *** 0.66 ** 0.69 *** 0.68 **
Output gap -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 * -0.08 *
Lagged public debt 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 ***
Government stability 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.10 ** 0.12 ** 0.12 **
Fiscal governance ("Commitment" dummy) 0.65 *** 0.66 *** 0.57 *** 0.56 *** 0.56 *** 0.56 ***
Government fragmentation -0.24 -0.31 … … … …
…… … …
Ideology 0.02 0.02 … … … …
…… … …
Election year (dummy) -0.32 ** -0.32 * -0.33 ** -0.33 ** -0.33 ** -0.33 **
Fiscal council index -0.13 ** -0.13 ** -0.12 ** -0.07 … …
……
Fiscal rule overall index 0.72 *** … 0.68 *** 0.23 -0.06 …
……
Fiscal rule coverage index … 0.54 *** … … … -0.06
…… … …
Constant -1.98 *** -1.96 *** -1.93 *** -2.00 *** -2.02 *** -2.01 ***
R-squared (overall)
F-test (country effects) 1.53 1.43 1.29 1.02 0.61 0.85
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.98 0.99 0.84 0.98 0.93 0.94
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-squared (p-value) 0.36 0.35 0.44 0.31 0.06 0.05
Cragg-Donald statistic (weak instrument) … … … 9.64 14.3 16.11
Exogeneity of suspect instrument (C statistic, p-value)
    - fiscal council index … … … 0.66 0.40 0.45
    - lagged debt … … … … 0.37 0.40
    - lagged CAPB … … … … 0.58 0.58
    - all of the above (joint test) … … … … 0.80 0.83
Notes: All estimates are obtained by two-stage least squares. Excluded instruments for the output gap are the lagged output gap 
and the average output gap in the US, France and Germany, except for France (Germany, US, and UK), and Germany (US, UK, 
and France). Instruments for the fiscal rule indices include government fragmentation, ideology, and dummies for SGP, the runup
to EMU, and the delegation form of fiscal governance. In the last two columns, the fiscal council index was also used as an 
excluded instrument.
(-0.51)
(0.58)
(2.96)
(-3.99)
(-1.93)
(-2.10)
(2.71)
(-1.02)
(5.84)
(1.53)
(12.46) (12.34) (12.51)
(-0.63)
(0.55)
(-1.89)
(-2.10)
(-2.02)
(-2.04)
(Robust t- or z-statistics in parentheses)
Instrumenting fiscal rules Instrumenting the output gap
(2.71)
(6.31) (4.51)
Table 2. Fiscal Reaction Functions: Exploring Reverse Causality
(Dependent variable: cyclically-adjusted primary balance)
(5.74)
(-1.04) (-1.05) (-1.48)
(12.43)
(-1.77)
(12.20)
(-1.77)
(1.59) (2.00)
(-1.98)
(5.16)
(2.36)
(2.87)
(5.12)
(2.31)
(2.86)
(-1.99)
(1.60)
(10.42)
(-2.00)
(-0.90)
(-3.89)
(3.07) (2.91)
(-0.15)
(3.79)
(2.85)
(2.88) (0.43)
(-3.73) (3.76)
(-0.23)
0.77
(-3.74)
0.78 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.78
 
 
Table 2 confirms the broad patterns observed in Table 1. The first 3 columns only instrument 
the output gap, assuming that fiscal institutions (both rules and the fiscal council index) are 
exogenous. While stricter and broader fiscal rules are associated with higher CAPBs 
(supporting the European Commission’s findings), elections also seem to play a role, with 
lower CAPBs being observed in election years. By contrast, the impact of government 
stability is less precisely estimated, and its coefficient is lower, reflecting possible 
collinearity with rules and elections. The fiscal council index enters with a negative and 
significant sign, which is somewhat counterintuitive. It is also worth noting that the Durbin-
Hu-Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis that the output gap is exogenous, despite 
the usual assumption of the contrary in most related empirical studies (e.g. Galì and Perotti,    35  
 
2003). However, that result may also reflect a relatively low power of the test in the context 
of this panel. 
 
Instrumenting the rules deeply affects estimates of their impact on fiscal behavior (Table 2) 
as it now appears that both the restrictiveness of the rules and their coverage have no 
meaningful effect on the CAPB. The Durbin-Hu-Hausman tests indicate that the potential 
endogeneity problem is at least as large as for the output gap. Exogeneity is even 
unambiguously rejected at standard levels of significance if the fiscal council variable (which 
loses significance when the rule index is instrumented) is used as an excluded instrument. 
Clearly, extensive robustness checks remain needed to understand more fully the apparently 
strong conditional correlation between rules and fiscal councils; but if anything, these results 
indicate that one should not dismiss the possibility of a causal relationship running from 
fiscal performance to rules.  
 
In that regard, Table 3 confirms the impression conveyed by specification tests that first-
stage regressions for rules are of good quality. The significant role of excluded exogenous 
variables is particularly noteworthy. These regressions unambiguously support the view that 
more disciplined governments (i.e. low public debt and high CAPB) tend to have more 
restrictive (or a broader coverage of) fiscal rules. Also, government stability—which is 
associated with better fiscal performance—is significantly positively correlated with the 
restrictiveness of the rules: the more stable the government, the more it will be willing to 
adopt rules. Rather strikingly, when controlling for all other determinants of the rules, 
delegation countries tend to have tightened fiscal rules by more than commitment countries 
over the sample period, perhaps reflecting a “catching up” effect as the former were generally 
less prone than the latter to have rules-based fiscal frameworks. 
 
Government fragmentation and ideology also appear to have a significant effect on the 
preference for tighter and more encompassing fiscal rules. Specifically, more fragmented 
governments seem to find it more convenient to enact binding rules committing all parties to 
the same aggregate objective than to rely on endless and paralyzing negotiations among 
coalition partners. Also, right-leaning governments seem to have an intrinsic appetite for less 
constraining arrangements than left-leaning governments. Finally, the fiscal council index 
enters with a positive, quantitatively large, and statistically significant coefficient. Once one 
appropriately controls for other determinants of rules, the presence of fiscal councils would 
thus appear to contribute positively to either the emergence of fiscal rules or their more 
effective enforcement. 
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Lagged public debt -0.00 *** -0.01 ***
Lagged CAPB 0.06 *** 0.08 ***
Government stability 0.05 *** 0.04
Delegation (dummy) 0.44 *** 0.58 ***
Commitment (dummy) 0.20 *** 0.28 ***
Government fragmentation 0.29 *** 0.48 ***
Ideology (conservative) -0.03 *** -0.04 ***
Output gap -0.01
SGP (dummy) -0.04
Runup to EMU (dummy) -0.10 * -0.08
Elections 0.02
Fiscal council index 0.11 *** 0.14 ***
Constant -0.12 -0.03
R-squared (overall)
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments
F test of excluded instruments 11.82 *** 19.24 ***
(-1.79)
(0.48)
(6.90)
(-0.66)
0.03
Sixth 
column in 
Table 2
(4.95)
(-0.42)
(1.08)
Fourth 
column in 
Table 2
(-3.36)
Table 3. First-stage Regressions for the Fiscal Rules Indices
(Dependent variable: fiscal rule index)
(0.32)
(-0.82)
(7.07)
(-0.15)
0.47
(4.97)
(2.18)
(6.64)
(3.03)
(3.15)
-0.01
-0.09
(7.22)
(3.33)
0.48
0.35
(1.52)
0.21
(-3.08)
(-1.12)
(-1.36)
(-3.70)
(4.10)
(3.24)
 
 
Overall, the results in Table 3 point to two important messages as regards the determinants of 
fiscal rules. First, rules are not primarily conceived as a mechanism tying the hands of 
naturally profligate governments, but rather as the manifestation of an implicit contract with 
the electorate, a public signal of the commitment to maintain mutually agreed standards of 
fiscal discipline. Second, fiscal rules have a procedural dimension that reflects the preference 
for certain forms of fiscal governance (see Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen, 2004). In 
both cases, the adoption of rules embodies a conscious commitment to fiscal discipline, not 
an attempt to suppress discretion and escape its potentially injudicious use. 
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IV.   CONCLUSIONS  
This paper has developed a stylized model of fiscal policy to illustrate the theoretical 
underpinnings of fiscal institutions. Two sets of issues were addressed: the credibility of 
optimal institutions; and the contribution of institutions over and above the influence of other 
factors, particularly that of specific political constituencies.  
The results highlight a number of important issues relating to fiscal outcomes and 
institutions. First, they suggest that electoral uncertainty is a key source of deficit bias, and 
therefore, a central determinant of fiscal institutions. The reason is that the perceived risk of 
not being re-elected drives policymakers’ discount rate below the social discount rate. That 
risk originates in voters’ incomplete information about the true motivations or competence of 
elected officials. The model thus suggests that, other things equal, countries with higher 
political instability (and a correspondingly higher risk of officials being voted out) should 
experience higher deficits on average. Such countries should correspondingly adopt stricter 
enforcement mechanisms of fiscal rules to ensure that deviations from the rule entail 
significant costs for the policymakers.  
 
Second, the model highlighted the possibility of reverse causality between institutions and 
outcomes. One reason for reverse causality is that institutions may be time-inconsistent 
because fiscal arrangements are self-enforced. Hence, intrinsically less stable governments 
will be more prone to weaken the disciplinary aspect of fiscal institutions (or not to adopt 
them in the first place). Another reason for reverse causality is that, under certain 
circumstances, fiscal institutions are more likely to be effective if the deficit bias under 
discretion is low so that low-deficit countries may be more likely to adopt them. 
The second part of the paper explored some of the empirical implications of the theory. I first 
documented broad correlations among various elements of the fiscal framework in EU 
countries, and then turned to quantifying the relationship between institutions and fiscal 
outcomes, focusing on two key dimensions: (i) the potential sources of fiscal bias, (ii) and the 
relationship between the restrictiveness and coverage of fiscal rules and fiscal outcomes.  
 
The results do not reject the role of political instability as a source of bias. Instability was 
also found to be associated with less restrictive and narrower rules, supporting the idea that 
the latter are used less as a tying-hand technology than as a signaling device to the electorate. 
The econometric evidence confirms that simultaneity issues could be at least as meaningful 
as in the case of the output gap. Accounting for that potential endogeneity bias severely 
weakens the estimated impact of rules under the null hypothesis of exogeneity. However, the 
results are preliminary and extensive robustness checks remain needed.  
 
The key policy conclusion emerging from the study is that rules are not primarily conceived 
as an agency of restraint. (In short, they are not meant to be binding.) Yet rules that 
appropriately reflect a broad consensus on desirable policies can play a useful role to signal a 
strong underlying commitment to fiscal discipline. As such, they can effectively enhance 
democratic accountability and secure appropriate electoral rewards to good fiscal behavior.    38  
 
V.   APPENDIX 
 
A.   Proof of Proposition 1 
At the beginning of period 1, voters assign a probability  0 , Q z  of 
+ ≥δ δ1  equal to 
() 1 2 − − p p ψ ,  L C Q , = , where  p  is a probability symbolizing voters’ prior about 
politicians’ incompetence.
29 With  2 1 0 < ≤ψ , voters update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule: 
if they observe 
+ ≥δ δ1 , the probability that party C is incompetent is revised to 
) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 (
p p
p
p
− + −
−
=
+
ψ ψ
ψ
, and  1 ≤ <
+ p p . As a result, the probability of 
+ ≥δ δ2  under Party 
C’s rule is increased to  ( ) 1 2 1 , − − =
+ + p p zC ψ . At the same time,  1 , 0 , 1 , C L L z z z < =  so that 
() [] () [] 2 , 1 2 , 1 L C q v E q v E < , and party L wins the election. If 
+ <δ δ1 , the probability that party 
C is incompetent is revised downward to 
) 1 )( 1 ( p p
p
p
− − +
=
−
ψ ψ
ψ
, which guarantees 
() [] () [] 2 , 1 2 , 1 L C q v E q v E > , and the re-election of party C. This establishes that, from the 
perspective of the incumbent, the probability of being re-elected is simply equal to the true 
probability of 
+ <δ δ1 , that is  δ δ
+ .  
B.   Proof of Proposition 2 
The first part of the proposition follows from the fact that no rationally chosen debt threshold 
b  should discourage the selection of the optimal debt 
* b  for any income shock  [ ] ε ε ε ; − ∈ , 
so that 
* b b ≥ . In the case of a strict inequality (
* b b > ), 
* b  is never an equilibrium strategy 
because for  0 = k , ( ) () ( )
*
2 ,
*
1 , 1 C C q v r q v ′ − > ′ . Restoring equality between these two terms (while 
keeping  0 = k ) requires more spending on public goods in period 1 than in period 2: 
* *
2 ,
* *
1 , C C q q > , or equivalently 
* * * b b >  (see Figure 1). The second part of the Proposition is 
established by applying the implicit function theorem to (9), which yields: 
() () () [] 0 1
1 * *
2 ,
* *
1 ,
* * < ′ ′ − + ′ ′ = ∂ ∂
−
C C q v r q v k b . Then it is clear from (9) that 
( ) () ( ) ( ) 0 1
*
1 ,
*
2 ,
*
1 ,
* > ′ = ′ − − ′ = C C C q v r q v r q v k  makes any deviation from 
* b  sufficiently costly to 
deter a deficit bias.
30 
                                                 
29 If  2 1 = ψ , then  1 δ  is not a signal of competence, and  1 , 0 , Q Q z z = ,  L C Q , =  irrespective of  1 δ . In that 
case, the incumbent government is assured to be re-elected, and the analysis of the political equilibrium loses 
any interest. 
30 See Beetsma and Debrun (2007) for a similar characterization of optimal fiscal institutions.    39  
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